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CHILD ABUSE: THE ROLE OF ADOPTION
AS A PREVENTATIVE MEASURE
INTRODUCTION

The problem of child abuse, as manifested by the "battered
child syndrome,"' has reached epidemic proportions in the
United States. 2 The abused child has become the major statistical factor in child death, now outdistancing the major childhood
diseasesA Illinois has not been spared from the outbreak of child
abuse 4 and has relied largely upon the judiciary" and the public 6 in an attempt to halt its growing instances.
In an effort to care for a child that lacks a proper home
or proper nurture, Illinois, as well as the forty-nine other states
and the District of Columbia, has enacted adoption statutes 7 with
practical ramifications that are beneficial to the adopted child
while likewise serving the best interests of society and the state. s
Adoption, by its defined purpose of benefit to the child as well
1. This syndrome means that a child has received repeated
and/or serious injuries by non-accidental means; characteristically,
these injuries are inflicted by someone who is ostensibly caring for
the child. There are several elements that are the criteria for the
'battered child syndrome.' These are: (1) the child is usually under
three years of age; (2) there is evidence of bone injury at different
times; (3) there are subdural hematomas with or without skull fractures; (4) there is a seriously injured child who does not have a
history given that fits the injuries; (5) there is evidence of soft tissue
injury; (6) there is evidence of neglect.
People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 506, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919, 921 (1971).
2. See N.Y. Times, August 16, 1971, at 16, col. 1. See also Paulsen,
Child Abuse Reporting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM.
L. REV. 1 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Paulsen]; Fontana, We Must Stop
the Vicious Cycle of Child Abuse, 50 PARENTS' MAG. 8 (1975) [hereinafter
cited as Fontana].
3. See Kempe, The Battered Child Syndome, 181 J.A.M.A. 17 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as Kempe]; Fontana, supra note 2, at 8.
4.

See generally R. HELFER & C. KEMPE, THE BATTERED CHILD (1968)

[hereinafter cited as HELFER & KEMPE].

5. In an attempt to curb child abuse the Juvenile Court Act has established a procedure for removing the child from the custody of the
parent. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, §§ 701-1-708-4 (1975).
6. The public at large has become involved in child abuse through
legislation requiring that such acts be reported. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 23,
§§ 20,51-2061 (1975).
7. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1-.1-24 (1975). The adoption statutes
may be a viable solution to ending the recurrence of child abuse in particular situations and thus an examination of adoption is important in
determining whether this role is adequately being met.
8. In re Simaner, 16 Ill. App. 2d 48, 147 N.E.2d 419 (1958). "The
adoption of friendless, dependent or orphan children tends to conserve
the best interests of society and the State .

. .

. The right of adoption is

not only beneficial to those immediately concerned, but likewise to the
public.' Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 368, 141 N.E. 178, 180 (1923).
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as to society, is a highly realistic and viable avenue for protecting children from the ravages of child abuse. With the increase
in child abuse reaching the epidemic level, it must be questioned
whether the Illinois adoption statute is adequately fulfilling this
role.
This comment will examine the role that adoption plays in
combating the child abuse dilemma. The examination will focus
upon the provision of the present adoption statute which allows
the termination of parental rights, a necessary step when the
parent refuses to consent to his child's adoption. Also contained
within this comment will be proposals for legislative amendments which will further the role of adoption in the prevention
of child abuse.
THE EPIDEMIC

HistoricalContext
Although the ravages of child abuse have received recent
publicity, in large measure such treatment of children is not a
product of modern times. Child abuse dates back to the earliest
times of recorded history" and was practiced by the ancient civilizations. 10 Past civilizations practiced infanticide and the abandonment of their children for practical reasons."
As the
civilizations grew older, infanticide subsided and a less deadly
form of abuse grew in its stead. As was stated by Sir William
Blackstone:
The ancient Roman laws gave the father a power of life and
death over his children; upon this principle, that he who gave
had also the power of taking away. (a) But the rigour of these
laws was softened by subsequent constitutions; so that (b) we
find a father banished by the Emperor Hadrian for killing his
son, though he had committed a very heinous crime, upon this
maxim, that 'patria potestas in pietate debet, non in atrocitate,
consistere.12
9. Abraham's attempt to use his son, Isaac, as a sacrifice to prove
his faith to God serves as an example of early practices. Genesis 22: 1-13.
Joshua's demand that children were to be used in the cornerstones for

the rebuilt walls of Jericho, Joshua 6:26, also tends to prove the practice
of infanticide.
10. For an excellent discussion of the maltreatment of -the child in
a historical context, see Thomas, Child Abuse and Neglect Part I:
Historical Overview, Legal Matrix, and Social Perspectives, 50 N.C.L.
REV. 293, 294-99 (1971-1972)
[hereinafter cited as Thomas].
11. Such practical reasons included population control, avoidance of
the embarrassment that ran concurrent with illegitimacy, the disposition
of a deformed child, as a religious ceremony and to maintain a familial
concentration of wealth by avoiding the dilution of an estate among
many children. See generally G. PAYNE, THE CHILD IN HUMAN PROGRESS
(1916); Thomas, supra note 10, at 294-95.
12. 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452 (Cooley ed. 1884). Parental
authority should consist or be exercised in affection, not in atrocity.
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The Battered Child Syndrome
"Each year in this country, thousands of innocent children
13
are beaten, burned, poisoned, or otherwise abused by adults.
This physical maltreatment of a child is evidenced by the
battered child syndrome. The battered child syndrome, as a
definitional term, was coined by Kempe in 1962,14 however, a plethora of medical articles on the subject is indicative of the fact
15
The disthat the subject matter was not a recent development.
tinctive phenomenon of the syndrome is characterized by a
specific pattern of injuries to the child.
The syndrome is defined best by a finding of multiple
injuries in various stages of healing and by a finding of soft
tissue generally in combination with malnutrition and poor hygienic attributes. An indispensable element of the syndrome is
the marked conflicts between the historical medical facts of the
child, as supplied by the parent, and the clinical findings of the
attending physician.16 Parental failure to adequately explain
the cause of an injury that is characterized by the physical
symptoms of the syndrome acts as a strong indication of parental
maltreatment. 17 Parental discipline"' is theoretically to be exercised out of affection and not in atrocity. The statistics of abuse,
however, fail to lend support to this belief.
The Growth Of The Epidemic
It is extremely difficult to obtain accurate information on
the precise extent of child abuse in America. Much of the maltreatment of children occurs within the privacy of the home.
Social class, poverty and geographical remoteness also tends to
The major incidents
isolate the abused child from society. 19
of abuse occur among children of tender years who are often
too young to adequately call out for help. 20 "Often, the child
13. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2763, 2764 (legislative
history).
14. Kempe, supra note 3.
15. See McCoid, The Battered Child and Other Assaults Upon The
Family: Part One, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1, 3-19 (1965) [hereinafter cited as
McCoid].
16. Id. at 18.
17. [T]he syndrome should be considered in any child exhibiting
evidence of possible trauma or neglect (fracture of any bone, subdural hematoma, multiple soft tissue injuries, poor skin hygiene, or
malnutrition) or where there is a marked discrepancy between the
clinical findings and the historical data as supplied by the parents.
Kempe, supra note 3, at 24.
18. "The power of a parent [must be] sufficient to keep the child
in order and obedience. He may lawfully correct his child, being under
age, in a reasonable manner; . . . for this is for the benefit of his education." 1 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *452 (Cooley ed. 1884).
19. See Thomas, supra note 10, at 333.
20. In a study by Dr. Vincent De Francis of 662 cases of child abuse
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victims are too young to either complain or understand that their
treatment is inappropriate."'21 Cases of abuse may often go undetected or be disregarded by neighbors who do not wish to become involved, or by relatives who refuse to believe that a parent
22
would intentionally brutalize his own child.
Statistics concerning the maltreatment of minor children
tend to be awesome in number, although, due to the inadequacy
of accurate information, 23 statistical data is often based upon
projections. Statistical reports have varied in the conclusions
reached as to the total number of child abuse incidents per year.
This discrepancy is due to the different methods of research employed. The extent of child abuse is reflected in different studies
which contain estimates that range as high as 1% of all children, 24 and reported or projected incidents ranging from
26
350,00025 to 4 million incidents per year.
No less staggering than the numbers involved are the
methods of savagery and brutality employed. The techniques
used in committing the abuse may be characterized as "a negative
testimony to the ingenuity and inventiveness of man. '27 The
implements and instrumentalities that the perpetrator uses range
from the common to the extraordinary. The more common
weapons include hairbrushes, bare fists, and heavy work boots.
only 10% of the children were over ten years of age with the preponderance below four years of age. Of the 178 children who died from
the abuse over 80% were under four years of age and 53.98% were under
two years of age. Seventy-two and one-half percent of the cases studied
consisted of parental infliction of the abuse. DE FRANCIS, CHILD ABUSEPREVIEW OF A NATION-WIDE SURVEY (Am. Humane Ass'n 1963) [hereinafter cited as DE FRANCIS]. See also HELFER & KEMPE, supra note 4;
Thomas, supra note 10, at 333.
21. Thomas, supra note 10, at 333. "The child in many cases cannot
speak for himself; he is either too young or too frightened to tell what
really happened." Miller, Fractures Among Children: I. Parental Assault as Causative Agent, 42 MINN. MED. 1209, 1211 (1959).
22. What informed persons have suspected and what many doctors
and social workers have believed, has been demonstrated, viz., that
parents too often are their children's worst enemies. It may be because one or more parent is psychotic, of extremely low intelligence,
of uncontrollable temper or was himself an abused child with serious
psychiatric after effects.
Harper, The Physician, the Battered Child, and the Law, 31 PEDIATRICS
899 (1963).
23. See notes 20-22 and accompanying text supra.
24. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1976, at 21, col. 1 (when non-physical neglect
and sexual abuse are considered in the child abuse definition).
25. N.Y. Times, June 27, 1973, at 28, col. 2. The number of child
abuse incidents is estimated to be 500,000 in another survey which took
into account physical, sexual and emotional child abuse. N.Y. Times,
August 16, 1971, at 16, col. 1-6.
26. The National Opinion Research Center of the University of Chicago conducted a study of 1,520 adult respondents of which 3% reported
personal knowledge of incidents of child abuse. The study thus set the
range of incidents of abuse between 2.5 and 4.0 million per year. HELFER
& KEMPE, supra note 4.
27. McCoid, supra note 15, at 15.
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The extraordinary instrumentalities that mete out a deadlier
punishment include chair legs, baseball bats, bottles and even
28
hot liquids, open flames and plastic bags.
Resultant injuries cannot be defined simply in terms of
broken bones or the type or extent of wounds inflicted. The
characteristics that manifest themselves in the abuse are evidenced by the entire condition of the child. Physical and mental
injuries in various stages of healing as well as a lack of a suitable explanation for such injuries act as a signal for suspected
abuse. 29 While abuse may be detectable from the presence of
these signals the initial incident is extremely difficult to predict
as abuse transends class, racial, ethnic and religious lines. Unfortunately, the initial occurrence is nonetheless as vicious30 as any
subsequent maltreatment. The court's power to act lies with the
court's ability to prevent a recurrence of the abuse to the same
child.
Recidivism
The recidivism rate of child abuse has reached the same epidemic proportions as the initial instances of abuse. Studies have
revealed that in most cases the maltreatment of a child is not an
isolated occurrance. Such studies indicate that the recidivism rate
32
may be as high as 90%.31 In a study by Morris and Gould of
twelve children who were subjected to physical abuse, eleven had
been injured previously. Three of the twelve children were
fatally injured upon the second event. 33 A follow-up survey of
fifty battered children found that three had subsequently been
killed and four others had been injured due to a second attack. 34
Estimates indicate that 25% to 50% of all cases will result in reinjury or death within a relatively short period of time. 3 5 Why
is it that an abused child is returned to his parent after an initial
confrontation has resulted in the child's injury?
28. Id.

See also DE FRANCIS, supra note 20.

29. Comment, The Child Abuse Epidemic: Illinois' Legislative Response and Some Further Suggestions, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 403 [hereinafter
cited as The Child Abuse Epidemic].
30. A study on child abuse injuries found bruises and contusions,
welts, swelling, lost teeth and eyes. Simple and compound fractures are
prevalent with many children exhibiting more than one break. One
child, five months old, suffered 30 broken bones. Ruptured livers,
spleens and lungs, and skull fractures with brain hemorrhage and
brain damage are a frequent diagnosis. McCoid, supra note 15, at 1516; DE FRANCIS, supra note 20, at 5-7.
31. Morris and Gould, Role Reversal: A Necessary Concept in Dealing with the Battered Child Syndrome, 33 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHiATRY 296
(1963).
32. Id.

33. Id.

34. Elmer, Identification of Abused Children, 10 CHILDREN 180, 183
(1963).
35. HELFER & KEmPE, supra note 4, at 51.
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The Illinois juvenile court system allows, as one possible
alternative, the return of a child to his parent after custody of
the child has been previously revoked in a custody proceeding. 36
The Juvenile Court Act3 7 establishes both the procedure 38 by
which an abused child3 9 is taken from parental custody 40 and
the procedure which may be employed to reinstate such custody.
The procedure which the Act requires for the revocation of custody contemplates essentially a trifurcated process.
The first phase occurs at the detention hearing 41 where the
court determines whether there exists probable cause for the removal of a child from parental custody. 42 If the court fails to
find probable cause the minor is released and the petition for
custody removal is dismissed. If, however, there is a probable
cause finding, an examination of persons with relevant testimony
will be held. The court may then place the minor in a shelter
43
care facility if such action is needed for the child's protection.
A probable cause finding brings the second stage into play.
The second phase is the adjudicatory hearing 44 in which the
court applies all of the civil rules of evidence 45 in an attempt
to determine whether the minor is actually in need of care. If
the court does not find the minor to be in need of care the petition is dismissed.4" However, upon a finding of neglect the judicial process continues. The court may make the minor a ward
of the court if the child is found to be neglected and it is found
to be in the child's best interests. 47 Both requirements may
be necessary to make the child the ward of the court, 48 and if
such wardship occurs then step three is applicable.
36. In re Overton, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 316 N.E.2d 201 (1974).
37. ILL. RaV. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-1 (1975).
38. See In re Garmon, 4 Ill. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972).

39. The Juvenile Court Act includes the concept "abused child"

within its definition of a neglected minor. A neglected minor is any

child under 18 years of age:

(a) who is neglected as to proper or necessary support, educa-

tion as required by law, or as to medical or other remedial care recognized under State law or other care necessary for his well-being,
or who is abandoned by his parents, guardian or custodian; or
(b) whose environment is injurious to his welfare or whose be-

havior is injurious to his own welfare or that of others.
ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 702-4 (1975).

40. Custody must be distinguished from termination of parental
rights. Custody only deals with a temporary removal from the parent

while termination of parental rights is permanent.
41. ILL. REV.STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6 (1975).

42. Removal is based upon a finding in accordance with ILL. REV.
ch. 37, § 702-4 (1975); see note 39 supra.
43. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 37, § 703-6(2) (1975).

STAT.

44. Id. § 704-2.
45. Id. § 704-6.

46. Id. § 704-8(1).
47. Id. § 704-8(2). This section requires that if a finding of neglect
was based on physical abuse, then the court's order should so state.

48. The statutory language seems to require two elements:

(1) a
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The third stage in the proceeding is the dispositional
phase. 49 After hearing evidence, the court determines how to
best preserve the interests of the child and society. The court's
dispositional alternatives for the child include, but are not re-

stricted to, placement with a relative, 50 a state agency,-"1 or
a return to the parent. "2 Even though the child is removed
from parental custody such disposition is not final, for the Act
states that "any person interested in the minor may apply to
the court for a change in custody of the minor . . . . "
This
allows the parent, from whose custody the child had been removed, to request the return of the child.
Reflecting an awareness of the recidivism rate once a child
has been returned to its parents, the Illinois legislature has attempted to alleviate this problem by enacting two amendments
to the Juvenile Court Act. The first such amendment requires
that adequate notice of any subsequent custody hearing be
given to any current foster parent who is the custodian of a

neglected child. This notice allows the foster parent to testify
at the custody rehearing and to offer evidence of the child's pre-

54
vious treatment before the status of the minor may be changed.

Prior to the amendment the custody rehearing was often held
in privacy without the knowledge of the foster parent. Under
the force of the current amendment the court may receive additional evidence, in the form of the foster parent's testimony,
and is thus assured of having all of the relevant facts concerning the past treatment of the child. The second amendment denies the immediate restoration of custody to any parent whose
custody was revoked based on a finding of child neglect resulting
from physical abuse. 55
finding of neglect and, (2) best interests of the child, as a prelude to
revocation of parental custody. In relevant part the statute states that
"[i]f the court finds that the minor is [neglected] and that it is in the
best interests of the minor and the public that he be made a ward of the
court ...
[the court] shall adjudge him a ward of the court ...
Id. § 704-8(2) [emphasis added].
49. Id. § 705-1.
50. Id. § 705-7(1) (a).
51. Id. § 705-7(1)(f).
52. Id. § 705-2(1) (c). Before the parent may regain custody of the
child the statute requires a hearing as to the parental fitness if the child
had been found to be neglected due to physical abuse.
53. Id. § 705-8(3).
54. Id. § 701-20(2). The amendment became effective Sept. 7, 1973.
55. Id. § 705-8(3). The amendment became effective Aug. 27, 1975.
In relevant part the amendment states:
custody of the minor shall not be restored to any parent . . . in any
case in which the minor is found to be neglected . . . and such
neglect is found by the court . . . to be the result of physical abuse
inflicted on the minor by such parent . . . until such time as a hearing is held on the issue of the fitness of such parent . . . to care
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While both amendments are commendable, they serve only
as the first step in protection of the abused child. The expressed
purpose of the Juvenile Court Act is to care for the child in his
own home if possible, to preserve family ties, and to serve the
best interest of the child. The Act allows removal of the child
from custody of the parent only when the safety of the child
cannot be protected."' Other recent legislative responses, in addition to the amendments to the Juvenile Court Act, have attempted to curtail the maltreatment of the child.
The main thrust of early child abuse prevention in Illinois
was the enactment of child abuse reporting laws.5 7 "With speed
uncharacteristic of state legislatures, all fifty states adopted some
form of child abuse reporting statute within a four year period
from 1963 to 1967."' 1 The objective of such laws is to receive
reports of abusive treatment so as to protect the best interest
of the child by offering protective services to prevent further
harm.5 9 The recent revision of the Illinois Reporting Act has
expanded the number of persons who are required to report any
suspected child abuse. The original reporting act was limited
in scope and effectiveness due to the placing of mandatory requirements of reporting only upon "any physician, surgeon, dentist, osteopath, chiropractor, podiatrist or Christian Science Practitioner ... .",,0The amendment's expanded list of persons
who are required to report is inclusive of those in the previous
statute plus "any . . .hospital . . . coroner, school teacher, school
administrator, truant officer, social worker, social service administrator, registered nurse, licensed practical nurse, director or
staff assistant of a nursery school or a child day care center,
law enforcement officer, or field personnel of the Illinois Department of Public Aid .... "1 Such an extension of the reporting
laws is a laudable step. The rise in child abuse, however, raises
questions as to the effectiveness of the reporting laws in combatfor the minor and the court enters and [sic] order that such parent
. ..is fit to care for the minor.
Id.
56. Id. § 701-2(1). The statute actually speaks to removal from the
parent's custody, while stressing the strong necessity of strengthening
family ties. The effect of removal from custody, as distinguished from
the effect of termination of parental rights, see note 40 supra, allows the
parent to seek the restoration of custody. The statute seems to favor

the restoration in its policy statement. It further requires a liberal construction "to carry out the foregoing purpose and policy." ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 37, § 701-2(4) (1975).
57. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2051-2061 (1975) (effective July 1, 1975)
(repealing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, §§ 2041-2047 (1965)).
58. Thomas, supra note 10, at 332; see Paulsen, supra note 2, at 1
n.1 (citations to the reporting statutes for the fifty states).

59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2052 (1975).
60. Id. § 2042 (1973) (repealed July 1, 1975).
61. Id.§ 2054 (1975).
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ing the problem. 2 The information gathered from the use of
reporting laws may lead to a temporary removal of the child
from the custody of his parents. However, when consent to such
action is withheld, a termination of parental rights is still necessary if the court intends permanently to remove the child from
the parents and to provide the child with a more stable environ63
ment through adoption.
THE ADOPTION ASPECT

The essence of the artificial relationship of adoption is to provide the child with the same atmosphere of love and care that
would theoretically exist if the child were the natural child of
the adoptive parents. Adoption finds its roots in the ancient
64
civilizations and the civil law.
In ancient times, adoption, as one of the oldest legal fictions,
served to prevent the extinction of the family and became one
of "the most perdurable of all artificial relationships designed
to prolong the continuity of the family existence." 65 Adoption
in ancient civilizations had religious overtones as each familial
group constituted and contrived its own domestic worship. The
adopted child was not only brought into a new family, but also
a new religion and consequently was required to sever all of his
past familial relationships. 66
The practice of adoption while ingrained in the Roman law
and in ancient civilizations was, nonetheless, unknown in England
67
under the Common Law.
The legal adoption by one person of the offspring of another,
giving him the status of a child and heir of the parent by
adoption was unknown to the law of England or of Scotland,
but was recognized by the Roman law, and exists in many coun62. See McCoid, supra note 15; Paulsen, supra note 2; Thomas, supra
note 10.
63. The, motivation behind many adoption statutes is to encourage a
strong family life as a means of normal child development "not only
as a worthy citizen, but as a person entitled to fulfillment of his personal
happiness." Simpson, The Unifit Parent: Conditions under which a
Child May Be Adopted without the Consent of his Parent, 39 U. DET.
L.J. 347, 350 (1961).
64. See generally Huard, The Law of Adoption: Ancient and Modern,
9 VANi. L. REv. 743 (1955-1956) for an excellent discussion of the history
of adoption. Adoption dates as far back as the Hindu laws of Manu and
the Code of Hammurabi, approximately 2,000 B.C.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 743-44.
67. The English regard for blood lineage played a strong role in barring the spread of adoption to England. Since adoption was primarily
for the continuation of the family the adoptee acquired an interest in
the adoptor's property. Consequently, there was a lack of acceptance
of adoption in England. England did not enact its first adoption statute
until 1926. Id. at 745.
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tries on the continent of Europe which derive their jurisprudence
from that law.68
The laws of the United States were derived primarily from the
English common law. Adoption, therefore, did not arrive in the
United States until the latter half of the 19th century ' and was
born purely as a statutory measure. Legislative enactments that
have no basis in the common law are granted special treatment
by the courts since there exists no case law history on which
to base the interpretation of the statute.
When a statute is enacted in derogation of the common law
such statute must be strictly and narrowly construed. 0 A statute in derogation of the common law creates a special power conferred by that statute. Such power lacks the aid of the common
law as an interpretative agent. Consequently, the courts have
employed a strict constructional approach to the actual language
of the statute. 71 In dealing with an adoption statute, however,
the Illinois courts have developed a "substantial compliance" test
which will allow an adoption so long as there is substantial compliance with the Adoption Act.
[I]t is well to remember that since the right of adoption is not
only beneficial to those immediately concerned but likewise to
the public, construction of the statute should not be narrow or
technical nor compliance therewith examined with a judicial
microscope in order that every slight defect may be magnified,
rather, the construction ought to be fair and reasonable, so as
all material pronot to defeat the act or beneficial results where
7
visions of the statute have been complied with. 2
The "substantial compliance" test, however, does not apply
to a finding of unfitness in order to terminate parental rights
in a situation where the parent refuses to tender his consent to
68. Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 243, 262 (1880); accord, In re Tilliski, 390
Ill. 273, 61 N.E.2d 24 (1944); Ashlock v. Ashlock, 360 Ill. 115, 195 N.E.
657 (1935); Butterfield v. Sawyer, 187 Ill. 598, 58 N.E. 602 (1900).
69. Illinois' first adoption statute was enacted in 1867. However,
adoption did arrive in the United States at an earlier time. States that
had based their legal systems upon the Civil Law-Louisiana and Texashad practiced adoption prior to the enactment of legislation in derogation
of the common law. Ross v. Ross, 129 Mass. 242 (1880).
70. The question of construction of adoption acts has been a problem area for many years. The highly remedial effect of adoption has
caused a desire to require only substantial compliance, in lieu of strict
compliance, with statutory requirements in cases of adoption. The argument that a mere technical flaw in pleadings should not vitiate an adoption has been upheld in Illinois. Gebhardt v. Warren, 399 Ill. 196, 77
N.E.2d 187 (1948); McDavid v. Fiscar, 342 Ill. App. 673, 97 N.E.2d 587
The Adoption Act states as the policy of the Legislature that
(1951).
"It]his Act shall be liberally construed and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law must be strictly construed shall not apply
to this Act." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20 (1975).
71. Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. (Dall.) 364, 367 (1797); Watts v. Dull,
184 Ill. 86, 56 N.E. 303 (1900).
72. Carter Oil Co. v. Norman, 131 F.2d 451, 455 (7th Cir. 1942).
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the adoption.7"

"[T]he rights of natural parents to their chil-

dren cannot be severed unless a clear and convincing case is
'7 4
presented in strict compliance with the Adoption Statute.
The Illinois Adoption Act"5 requires the termination of
parental rights or parental consent before an adoption decree may
be judicially rendered.7 6 The termination of parental rights is
judicially determined and based upon a finding of parental unfitness as defined in the Adoption Act. 77 This termination must
be proven by a showing of clear and convincing proof of unfitness. 78 In consideration of the requirement of strict and narrow
construction plus the requirement of clear and convincing proof
for the establishment of unfitness, the legislature must clearly
delineate the grounds set forth for the termination of parental
rights. 79 A clear delineation would help to effectuate the benign
purpose of adoption in the modern context.
73. Under the circumstances of termination of parental rights the
courts require that there be a strict and narrow construction of the Adoption Act. Watts v. Dull, 184 Ill. 86, 56 N.E. 303 (1900). While the Adoption Act requires a liberal construction, regardless of being in derogation
of common law, the case law dealing with the termination of parental
rights does not follow this legislative pronouncement. E.g., In re OverApp. 3d 1014, 316 N.E.2d 201 (1974); In re Moriarity, 14 Ill.
ton, 21 Ill.
App. 3d 553, 302 N.E.2d 491 (1973).
74. In re Overton, 21 Ill. App. 3d 1014, 1018, 316 N.E.2d 201, 204
(1974).

75. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, §§ 9.1-1-.1-24 (1975).
76. Id. § 9.1-8; In re Schuman, 22 Ill. App. 3d 151, 319 N.E.2d 287
(1974).
77. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(d) (1975 & Supp. 1976).

78. Culkin v. Culkin, 30 Ill. App. 3d 1073, 333 N.E.2d 698 (1975); In

re Moriarity, 14 Ill. App. 3d 553, 302 N.E.2d 491 (1973); see note 54 and
accompanying text supra.

79. The grounds for a finding of unfitness are:
(a) Abandonment of the child;
(b) Failure to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern
or responsibility as to the child's welfare;
(c) Desertion of the child for more than 3 months next preceding the commencement of the Adoption proceeding;
(d) Substantial neglect of the child if continuous or repeated;
(e) Extreme or repeated cruelty to the child;
(f) Failure to protect the child from conditions within his environment injurious to the child's welfare;
(g) Other neglect of, or misconduct toward the child; provided
that in making a finding of unfitness the court hearing the adoption
proceeding shall not be bound by any previous finding, order or
judgement affecting or determining the rights of the parents toward
the child sought to be adopted in any other proceeding except such
proceeding terminating parental rights as shall be had under either
this Act or the Juvenile Court Act;
(h) Depravity;
(i) Open and notorious adultery or fornication;
(j) Habitual drunkenness for the space of one year prior to the
commencement of the adoption proceeding.
(k) Failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest, concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child during
the first 30 days after its birth.
(1) Failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions
which were the basis for the removal of the child from his parents
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The purpose of an adoption statute is to promote the general
welfare of the child and benefit society. 0 The status of the
adopted child"1 is changed in relation to the adoptive parent
in a process in the nature of an in rem proceeding 2 with the
effect that "[t] he decree, by force of . . . statute, establishe [s], eo
instanti its rendition, the relation of parent and child, impos [ing]
upon the parties the reciprocal duties and obligations of that
relation .... ,,s3The modern adoption statute has, therefore,
altered the ancient concept of "adoption as furthering the
family" to "adoption for the welfare of the child and the benefit to society. 's 4 "The true genesis of our adoption laws, whatever their exact vintage, seem to lie in the increasing concern
for the welfare of neglected and dependent children
"8. and
thus the promotion of societal interests.8 6
The most striking consequence of the adoption process is the
ultimate effect upon the relationship of the natural parent to
the adopted child. The requirement in ancient civilizations of
a complete severance by the adopted child of all previous familial
bonds has been carried to the modern adoption statutes.8 7 Consent to adoption by the natural parent or a finding that such
parent is unfit is a prelude to the conclusive severance of parental rights. In a consensual termination of parental rights,"s the
parent voluntarily relinquishes any claims upon the child. An
order terminating parental rights on a finding of unfitness also
dissolves all legal claims to the child. 9 Consequently, a terminaor to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to
his parents within twenty-four months after an adjudication of
neglect under Section 2-4 of the Juvenile Court Act.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (1975 & Supp. 1976).
80. E.g., People ex rel. O'Conner v. Cole, 322 Ill. 95, 152 N.E. 554
(1926); Hopkins v. Gifford, 309 Ill. 363, 141 N.E. 178 (1923).
81. See 2 J. Au'SnN, JURISPRUDENCE 709-11 (1869)
(discussion of
status).
82. Van Matre v. Sankey, 148 Ill. 536, 36 N.E. 628 (1893).
83. Id. at 558-59, 36 N.E. at 634.
84. See generally Kuhlman, Intestate Succession by and from the
Adopted Child, 28 WASH. L.Q. 221, 223-24 (1943).
85. Huard, The Law Of Adoption: Ancient And Modern, 9 VAND. L.
REV. 743, 748 (1955-1956).
86. People ex rel. O'Connor v. Cole, 322 Ill. 95, 152 N.E. 554 (1926).

87. "[A]doption severs conclusively the rights and interests of natural parents." In re Shuman, 22 Ill. App. 3d 151, 153, 319 N.E.2d 287, 289
(1974); accord, Willey v. Lawton, 8 Ill.
App. 2d 344, 132 N.E.2d 34 (1956).
88. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
89. E.g., People v. Gibbs, 30 Ill. App. 3d 878, 333 N.E.2d 266 (1975);
Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 97 N.E.2d 584 (1951).
After the entry either of an order terminating parental rights

or the entry of an order of adoption, the natural parents of a child
sought to be adopted shall be relieved of all parental responsibility
for such child and shall be deprived of all legal rights as respects
the child, and the child shall be free from all obligations of maintenance and obedience as respects such natural parents.
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-17 (1975 & Supp. 1976).
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tion of parental rights is a harsh step which the courts believe
must only be taken upon strict compliance with the grounds set
forth in the adoption statute110
With the termination of parental rights, the parent foregoes
all of the benefits that a natural parent normally enjoys, yet
some of the liabilities remain. The adopted child may still inherit property from the natural parent even though there has
The natural
been a judicial termination of parental rights.'
parent may also discover that regardless of the termination of
the rights, including all obligations, there still exists a duty of
the natural parent to support the adopted child if the adopting
parent fails to do S0.92 While the child's right to inheritance
continues and the natural parents' duty to support remains, the
9
natural parent retains only a limited benefit. 3 Another adverse
consequence of the termination of parental rights is the for4
feiture of the natural parents' right to child visitation.'1 Due
to such severe consequences, the courts are reluctant to allow
involuntary termination unless the statute defining unfitness is
strictly complied with.
Grounds For Involuntary Termination
Of ParentalRights
Absent parental consent to adoption, a finding of unfitness
must occur before a termination of parental rights may be
ordered.95' Such a finding of unfitness must be made in accord90. "In adoption it is not the duty of the court to determine if petitioners could best provide for the child. The court must first determine
if statutory grounds for adoption exist." Oeth v. Erwin, 6 Ill. App. 2d
18, 22, 126 N.E.2d 526, 528 (1955). See notes 70-73 and accompanying
text supra. A finding of unfitness based upon the grounds set forth in
the Adoption Act has also been incorporated into the Juvenile Court Act.
See note 95 and accompanying text infra.
91. See, e.g., In re Cregar, 30 Ill. App. 3d 798, 333 N.E.2d 540 (1975)
(construing ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-4 (1975)). The statute allows the
child to inherit from both his adoptive and natural parents. The statute
further allows the adoptive parents and their lineal and collateral kindred the right to inherit from the child.
92. Dwyer v. Dwyer, 366 Ill. 630, 10 N.E.2d 344 (1937); Anderson v.
Anderson, 320 Ill. App. 75, 49 N.E.2d 841 (1943); Ryan v. Foreman, 181
Ill. App. 262 (1913), aff'd, 262 Ill. 175, 104 N.E. 189 (1914).
93. The natural parent may, however, inherit from the adopted child
any property that the child had received from the natural parent or his
lineal or collateral heirs by gift, will or by intestacy laws. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 3, § 2-4(b) (1975).
94. People v. Gibbs, 30 Ill. App. 3d 878, 333 N.E.2d 226 (1975). The
adoptive parent does not actually replace the natural parent in all legal
respects. A distinction between the natural parents and the adoptive
parents still remains with the child always being the child of the natural
parents, even though all obligations on behalf of the child are removed.
In re Leichtenberg, 7 Ill. 2d 37, 131 N.E.2d 487 (1956).
95. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(1) (1975) (The Juvenile Court Act
requires consent of the parent or a finding of unfitness under the Adop-
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ance with the grounds set forth in the Adoption Act as expressly
incorporated into the Juvenile Court Act." Many of the provisions enacted set forth viable instructions for the court in arriving
at a decision on termination. Abandonment, 7 desertion,9 depravity,!'! open and notorious adultery or fornication, 10 0 habitual
drunkenness, 10 1 failure to care for a newborn, 10 2 and failure
to correct conditions from which an earlier finding of neglect
has arisen10 3 are statutory grounds for unfitness. The mentioned statutory grounds are clear and explicit. Other grounds,
however, tend to be ambiguous-a factor working against a finding of parental unfitness.
Such other grounds as the failure to maintain a reasonable
degree of interest,' 0 4 the failure to protect the child from an
injurious environment,'r substantial neglect if continuous and
repeated, 10 " other neglect or misconduct, 1 ' and extreme or
repeated cruelty' 018 fail to sufficiently illuminate the exact requirements which are necessary for a finding of unfitness. Such
a failure causes a degree of uncertainty within the statute, and
consequently, a finding of unfitness in strict compliance with
those grounds is extremely difficult. The idea of allowing the
tion Act).

ILL.

REV. STAT.

ch. 4, § 9.1(D) (g)

(1975 & Supp. 1976) re-

quires a finding under the Adoption Act or the Juvenile Court Act for
termination.
96. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-9(3) (1975).
97. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (a) (1975). Abandonment requires proof of an intent by the parent to relinquish all claims, duties,
and obligations to the child. "Abandonment is conduct on the part of
a parent which demonstrates a settled purpose to forgo all paternal duties and to relinquish all parental claims to the child." In re Cech, 8
Ill. App. 3d 642, 644, 291 N.E.2d 21, 23 (1972). Accord, Townsend v. Curtis, 15 Ill. App. 3d 209, 303 N.E.2d 566 (1973); In re Moriarity, 14 Ill.
App. 3d 553, 302 N.E.2d 491 (1973).
98. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (c) (1975). The legislature distinguishes desertion from abandonment by specifying each as a separate
ground. Stalder v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 107 N.E.2d 696 (1952); Hill v.
Allabaugh, 333 Ill. App. 602, 78 N.E.2d 127 (1948). Desertion is an intention to terminate custody only and not to terminate all parental claims
and obligations. In re Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972);
App. 3d 261, 280 N.E.2d 770 (1972).
In re Smith, 4 Ill.
99. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (h) (1975). Depravity has been
defined as "an inherent deficiency of moral sense and rectitude." Stalder
v. Stone, 412 Ill. 488, 498, 107 N.E.2d 696, 701 (1948). Accord, Taylor
v. Starkey, 20 Ill. App. 3d 630, 314 N.E.2d 620 (1974).
100. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (D) (i) (1975); Culkin v. Culkin, 30
Ill. App. 3d 1073, 333 N.E.2d 698 (1975).
101. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1(D) (j) (1975).
102. Id. § 9.1-1 (D) (k).
103. Id. § 9.1-1(D) (1); People v. Gibbs, 30 Ill. App. 3d 878, 333 N.E.2d
226 (1975).
104. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (D) (b) (1975); In re Einbinder, 31
Ill. App. 3d 133, 334 N.E.2d 187 (1975).
105. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (D) (f) (1975); People v. Gibbs, 30
Ill. App. 3d 878, 333 N.E.2d 226 (1975).
106. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (D) (d) (1975).
107. Id. § 9.1-1(D) (g) (1975 & Supp. 1976).

108. Id. § 9.1-1(D)(e) (1975).
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courts great flexibility in defining unfitness so as to permit such
a finding under varied factual situations is a laudable idea since
each case turns on its own peculiar set of facts. 10 9 The requirement of strict compliance with the statutory provisions, however,
must be viewed as a limitation to this judicial elasticity when
such provisions are difficult to define.
Due to the uncertainty inherent in a finding of unfitness,
the courts, acting under the Juvenile Court Act, frequently find
a child to be "neglected," thereby temporarily avoiding permanent termination of parental rights. In In re Garmon,110 although
the trial court found that the children had been abused and neglected, the children were returned to the custody of their parents under court supervision.11 ' The Garmon court failed to
terminate parental rights of the natural parents because of the
difficulty it had in determining "whether or not the degree of
neglect was such that the parents have forfeited their natural
rights .... "112 Therefore, the courts may find that a person"'
caring for a child has physically abused that child but conclude
that no permanent revocation of rights should occur.
In People v. Paris,"' the stepfather of the injured
children was criminally convicted of cruelty to children under
an Illinois statute which provided for imprisonment from one to
three years."' In this case the defendant had stripped the children of their clothing and whipped them with a length of insulated electric bell wire with almost two inches of copper wire
exposed. Bloody marks were found on the children six days later
when one of them "complained to his teacher that he hurt."116
The natural mother had protested but took no action to stop the
attacks. Because it was his first offense and testimony was of109. In re Grant, 29 Ill. App. 3d 731, 331 N.E.2d 219 (1975).
110. 4 Ill. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
111. "Child protection service is foster-home care and counseling; in
most communities it is of inadequate quality, continuity and supervision
by a welfare department." N.Y. Times, March 2, 1976, at 32, col. 3; accord, [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEWS 2763.
112. 4 Ill. App. 3d at 393, 280 N.E.2d at 20.
113. While a termination of parental rights is being dealt with in this
comment, the Adoption Act does not restrict a finding of unfitness solely
to a parent. "[A ]y person whom the court shall find to be unfit to
have a child sought to be adopted . . ." (ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-1 (D)
(1975)) may be permanently denied accessibility to a child.
114. 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 267 N.E.2d 39 (1971).
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 23, § 2368 (1975) ("[alny person who shall
willfully and unnecessarily . . . in any manner injure in health or limb
any child . . . shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony."). ILL. REV. STAT. ch.

38, § 1005-8(1) (b) (5) (1975)

(a class 4 felony permits a sentence of one

year to a maximum of three years).

The judge, however, may reduce

or modify the sentence. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-8(1) (d) (1975).
116. People v. Paris, 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 935, 267 N.E.2d 39, 41 (1971).
The children's ages ranged from three years of age to seven years of
age.
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fered that the defendant was actually a mild mannered person,
the appellate court remanded the case to the circuit court for
resentencing in accordance with its opinion and ordered the sentence restricted to a fine or probation. The abused children were
merely removed from the custody of their mother and the defendant without a termination of parental rights based upon unfitness.1 17 The offense committed was serious enough to allow
a sentence in the penitentiary for a maximum period of three
years, yet under the Adoption Act neither the defendant nor the
mother were found to be unfit. Whether the lack of such a finding is based upon the inadequacy of the Adoption Act or the
failure of the judge to act in accordance with the Adoption Act,
the fact remains that the child suffers.
It appears that often the termination of parental rights is
based upon judicial whim. In Townsend v. Curtis,118 the appellate court stated that it should not reverse the circuit court's
decision concerning the unfitness of the natural parent unless
such decision was against the weight of the evidence. The Townsend court, therefore, refused to reverse a finding of unfitness,""
based on the ground of abandonment, 20 where the divorced
natural father, while serving a prison sentence, contributed child
support and sent occasional postcards. This situation raises the
question as to whether or not the legislature has established proper judicial standards for a finding of unfitness. The lack of proper
legislative guidance is apparent where the court allows termination in a Townsend-type case as compared with the situation
where a child is severely beaten,'1 2 1 or where a child lacks food,
proper medical care and is continually placed in physical danger' 2 2 and termination is not permitted. Failure to provide
117. Since the children are placed in a foster-home the possibility exists that the mother and the defendant would regain custody. See notes
36-40 and accompanying text supra.
118. 15 Ill. App. 3d 209, 303 N.E.2d 566 (1973).

119. The appellate court did state, however, that under the facts the

denial of a termination would be proper. Id. at 212, 303 N.E.2d at 569.
120. See note 99 supra. But cf. In re Moriarity, 14 Ill. App. 3d 553,
302 N.E.2d 491 (1973) where the appellate court reversed a finding of
abandonment when the parent, recently released from jail, failed twice

to keep an appointment to see her child.
121. People v. Paris, 130 Ill. App. 2d 933, 267 N.E.2d 39 (1971).
122. In re Garmon, 4 Ill. App. 3d 391, 280 N.E.2d 19 (1972).
In Gar-

mon, the children were found to be abused, without needed medical attention for infected diaper rash and sores, dirty, and ill-fed. Testimony
was also introduced to show that the baby was often found covered with
flies. There was no running water or electricity, improper sanitation and
an out-house that had been inoperative for a long period of time. The

police had been summoned on a number of occasions in order to quell

fights between the parents which placed the children in physical danger.
In a previous proceeding to the one at bar, a trial court, after considering

the situation, returned the children to the custody of the parents. The
persistence of these conditions eventually caused parental termination.
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strict legislative standards creates uncertainty among the courts
and may play a major role in causing the unwarranted return
of a child to an otherwise unfit parent.
The Best Interests Of the Child
The Adoption Act requires that "[t]he welfare of the child
'' 2"
shall be the prime consideration in all adoption proceedings. '
While the "prime consideration" of the statute is clearly the "welfare of the child," the judicial interpretation of the statute has
been otherwise. The termination of parental rights involves
immediate and future consequences that the natural parent
should not be forced to accept based solely upon the "welfare
of the child." While the welfare of the child may require that the
child be placed with a party better equipped financially and emotionally to care for it, the natural parent's right to the society and
service of his child should not be displaced unless parental violation of the statute on unfitness has occurred. 24 Absent consent,
a finding of unfitness is required for termination and consequent
adoption. Without such a finding, there can be no adoption
12
regardless of the child's needs. 5,
The Adoption Act also requires that "[t] he best interests and
welfare of the person to be adopted shall be of paramount consideration in the construction and interpretation of this
Act."' 26 The courts, however, have recognized that the inherent rights of the natural parent cannot be judicially abrogated
absent clear and convincing proof of a statutory violation.
Thus, the best interest of the child tends to play an important
27
but subservient role.'
Unless the proof is clear that the natural parents are unfit to
have the care, custody and control of the child, the contest for
the control of the child's future between persons having no vested
interest in the child . . . as against the natural law which binds
a mother8 to her child, should be resolved in favor of the
12
mother.
123. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-15 (1975).
124. In re Shuman, 22 11. App. 3d 151, 319 N.E.2d 287 (1974); In re
Walpole, 5 Ill. App. 2d 362, 125 N.E.2d 645 (1955).
125. See In re Smith, 4 I1. App. 3d 261, 280 N.E.2d 770 (1972); Robinson v. Neubauer, 79 Ill. App. 2d 362, 223 N.E.2d 705 (1976).
126. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-20a (1975).
127. E.g., In re Gonzales, 25 Ill. App. 3d 136, 323 N.E.2d 42 (1974);
Breger v. Seymour, 74 Ill. App. 2d 197, 219 N.E.2d 265 (1966).
128. In re Dickholtz, 341 Ill. App. 400, 404, 94 N.E.2d 89, 91 (1950).
See In re Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 645, 291 N.E.2d 21, 23-24 (1972) ("[A]bsent consent or unfitness, an adoption can[not] be granted solely upon
the basis of the best interest of the child."); accord, Tiernan v. Stewart,
33 Ill. App. 3d 545, 338 N.E.2d 153 (1975); In re Grant, 29 Ill. App. 3d
731, 331 N.E.2d 219 (1975). The best interests of the child are not independent grounds for allowing a termination. Culkin v. Culkin, 30 Ill.
App. 3d 1073, 333 N.E.2d 698 (1975).
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The proper environment for a child is of paramount importance when the issue to be decided is custody and not termination
The Juvenile Court Act states that
of parental rights. 120
parental rights cannot prevail when the court determines that
such rights are contrary to the child's well-being.' 30 Relief for
the child may be the compelling reason behind a temporary revocation of custody. However, it cannot be the sole dictate for
31
a similar result in an adoption proceeding.
Adoption, which effects the course of inheritance deprives a child
of a place in which it was placed by nature, and by force of
law thrusts the child into another relationship, while severing
forever and conclusively the legal rights and interests of the
from a change
natural parents, and is a very different matter
1 32
of custody, which could be on a temporary basis.
CONCLUSION

Child abuse, which is currently at epidemic levels, creates
not only personal injuries to the child but also scars society as
a whole. One of the expressed purposes of adoption is the benefit to society by providing the care to which these unfortunate
children are entitled. 33 Preventing the spread and incidents of
child abuse is a benefit to society in that the abused child, may
be prevented from becoming an abusing adult.' 3 ' This correlation between allowing adoption and the prevention of child abuse
is therefore of great import.
Legislative attempts to protect the abused child have proven
ineffective in checking the growth of abuse. The increase in the
incidents of child abuse are testimony to the ineffectiveness of
such legislation as the child abuse reporting laws.' 35 In Illinois,
cases of suspected child abuse have been reported in increasing
numbers from 500 in 1965, to 800 in 1972. The number of incidents estimated to have occurred in Illinois, however, number
129. See note 40 supra, for the distinction between custody and termination.
130. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 701-2(3) (c) (1975).
131. See People ex rel. Edwards v. Livingstone, 42 Ill. 2d 201, 247 N.E.
2d 417 (1969); In re Grant, 29 Ill. App. 3d 731, 331 N.E.2d 219 (1975);
In re Cech, 8 Ill. App. 3d 642, 291 N.E.2d 21 (1972).
132. Jackson v. Russell, 342 Ill. App. 637, 639, 97 N.E.2d 584, 585
(1951). See generally Comment, The Best Interests Of The Child-The
Illinois Adoption Act In Perspective, 24 DE PAUL L. REV. 100 (1974).
133. Bartholow v. Davies, 276 Ill. 505, 114 N.E. 1017 (1916); Meyer v.
App. 189 (1899).
Meyer, 32 Ill.
134. See Harper, The Physician, the Battered Child, and the Law, 31
PEDIATRIcs 899 (1963).
135. Studies have shown that incidents of abuse range from the hundreds of thousands to the millions, yet reports of incidents are only a
fraction of those numbers. The discrepancy between the number of incidents and the number of reported cases, while not conclusive, does indicate the inadequacy of the reporting laws to expose child abuse let alone
work as a preventative measure. See generally The Child Abuse Epidemic, supra note 29, at 403.
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between 17,500 and 200,000.136 The reluctance of private physicians to report suspected cases of child abuse, especially when
the physician is a personal friend of the perpetrator or his family,
is a partial explanation for the discrepancy between the number
of incidents estimated and the actual number of reported
cases. 1 7 Such reported cases may constitute only the "more
sensational 'tip of the iceberg.' "138
With the reported incidents of abuse representing only a
small portion of the number of children actually maltreated the
legislature and the judiciary must act, not to vindictively abrogate the laws of nature but rather to designate a class of persons
who shall forfeit such natural rights. Social and welfare agencies cannot adequately fulfill this role on their own.
While the medical profession plays a major role in the identification of the battered child and will have a primary role in
the alleviation of the consequences of parental abuse and the rehabilitation of the abuser, and while the welfare and social
worker must play major roles in the resolution of the problem,
ultimately the solution must be legal, in the form of legislation
machinery of the state designed
and judicial decisions and the
139
for the protection of the child.
The judiciary generally seeks to gleen the legislative intent from
the statutes that have been enacted. The apparent policy of the
legislature is toward child protection and the courts, reluctant
as they are to terminate parental rights when nonconsensual,'14
should pay more than mere lip service to this legislative intent.
In no area is the combined work of the legislature and the
judiciary needed more than in the area of reducing the rate of
child abuse recidivism.14 '
The courts must work to prevent
situations where a child is returned to his parents' custody only
to be hung upside down by his ankles and beaten until he
dies,'142 or where a mother regains custody of her child after
14 3
an initial removal for abuse and then beats the child to death.
136. Id. at 404.
137. Id. at 404 n.16. The recent amendment expanding the category
of people required to report suspected child abuse should have a beneficial effect upon lowering the discrepancy between the number of child
abuse incidents and the number of reported cases. Yet the same factors
of not wanting to be involved and personal friendship with the suspected
abuser may cause the reported incidents to remain lower than the actual
incidents.
138. Thomas, supra note 10, at 334.
139. McCoid, supra note 15, at 3.
140. See notes 93-96 and accompanying text supra.
141. The difficulty in preventing the initial incident makes it even
more imperative that the recidivism rate be lowered. Even though the
first attack cannot be stopped, it is within the court's power and the legislature's power to combat a recurrence.
142. Chicago Tribune, Sept. 1, 1972, at 1, col. 1. The infamous case
of six year old Johnny Lindquist.
143. N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1976, at 35, col. 1. The recent amendment
to the Juvenile Court Act denying the return to the parent of a physically
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Adoption therefore, although not a panacea, assists in the reduction of recidivism while concurrently promoting the natural
parent-child relationship.
The ability to prove child abuse in a court of law is often
very difficult. 144 One problem is that each incident of abuse
tends to contain a unique set of facts. 145 In the battered child
syndrome, child abuse is manifested not only by the immediate
injury but also by the discovery of old or hidden injuries. 146
Once child abuse is found, the burden of proof should be placed
upon the parent to prove that he is fit to retain his parental
rights. The child's right to safety should take precedence over
the parental right to the custody of his child.
The assumption that, generally the child is "better off" in the
home, surrounded by the loving care of his parents is no doubt
sound enough, but the exceptions are sufficiently numerous to
warrant more attention by appropriate agencies and professional
1 47
individuals, public and private, than they have received.
The basic premise that the child receives better care in the home
of his natural parent is questionable when such parental care
includes abuse. 1 48 The experiences of child maltreatment requires, in the words of the former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, Caspar W. Weinberger, that "child abuse and
neglect . . . is grave and that we have yet to find 'an ultimate
solution' ,,149 in today's society.
Socio-economic conditions, 11 0 the lack of employment"'
and emotional stress" 2 serve -as contributing factors in the
dilemma's growth rate and in the continuation of the cyclical
pattern in which an abused child becomes an abusing adult.
"With the many stresses all of us experience these days, there
is more adult frustration and anger which can trigger child
abuse."' 53 Swift judicial and legislative action is, therefore, urgently needed to prevent child abuse. In an effort to facilitate
such action the following legislative amendments to the Adoption
Act's definition of an unfit person are proposed.
abused child, before a hearing as to parental fitness, will hopefully alleviate this problem. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 705-8(3) (1975).
144. See Paulsen, The Legal Framework for Child Protection, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 675 (1966).
145. In re Grant, 29 Ill. App. 3d 731, 331 N.E.2d 219 (1975).

146. See note 1 supra. Soft tissue, healing sores and scratches, and

bones in various stages of repair all indicate a prior abuse. See also
People v. Jackson, 18 Cal. App. 3d 504, 95 Cal. Rptr. 919 (1971).
147. Harper, The Physician,the Battered Child, and the Law, 31 PEDIATRICS 899 (1963).
148. Comment, The Best Interests Of The Child-The Illinois Adoption
Act In Perspective, 24 DE PAUL L. REv. 100 (1974).
149. [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2763, 2766.
150. Thomas, supra note 10, at 334-38.
151. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1976, at 21, col. 2.
152. See Fontana, We Must Stop The Vicious Cycle Of Child Abuse,
50 PARENT'S MAG. 8 (1975).
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"Unfit person" means any parent or other person responsible
for a child whom the court shall find to be unfit to have the
child sought to be adopted, the grounds of such unfitness being
any one of the following:
(a) Abandonment of the child;
(b) Desertion of the child for more than three months next
preceding the commencement of the adoption proceeding;
(c) Depravity;
(d) Open and notorious adultery or fornication;
(e) Failure to demonstrate a reasonable degree of interest,
concern or responsibility as to the welfare of a newborn child
during the first thirty days after birth;
(f) Failure to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions which were the basis for the removal of the child from
the parent's custody or to make reasonable progress toward the
return of the child to his parents within twenty-four months
after an adjudication of neglect under Section 2-4 of the Juvenile
Court Act;
(g) Addiction to a hazardous substance or habitual drunkenness for the space of one year prior to the commencement of
the adoption proceeding provided that the addiction is so severe
that the person lacks the capacity to control or provide for the
child sought to be adopted;
(h) The infliction or allowance of an infliction of any act
which causes grievous bodily harm, by other than accidental
means, or any act which tends to cause disfigurement or loss
of bodily function, by other than accidental means;
(i) The performance or allowance to be performed of any
act of sexual abuse with or upon the child;
(j) Any act of omission or commission which subjects the
child to an injurious environment, by failing to provide the
minimum degree of care in supplying adequate education, food,
supervision, shelter, clothing, medical or surgical or other remedial care, so as to indicate harm or threatened harm to the child's
health or welfare, provided that the person having custody of
the child is financially able to provide the minimum degree of
such care;
(k) Any other act of omission or commission, not ordinary
or reasonable, which creates or allows to be created a serious
deteriorating or endangering of the health, emotional well-being
or morals of the child.
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